Religion and Politics Among Southern High School Seniors: A Gender and Race Analysis

Donald E. Whistler and Gary D. Wekkin / University of Central Arkansas

Introduction

"'People act politically, economically, and socially in keeping with their ultimate beliefs. Their values, mores, and actions, whether in the polling booth, on the job, or at home, are an outgrowth of the god or gods they hold at the center of their being.'” (Robert Swierenga quoted in Wald 42.)

Christian religious beliefs were pervasive in shaping early American political institutions and policies.¹ By mid-20th century, however, social scientists typically assumed that the declining influence of religious authority over public policies had reduced religion in America to private matters unimportant politically (Dunn 1; Kellstedt and Noll 355). To be sure, religious authority over public policies declined during the 20th century (Fowler 13-20; Wald chs 2-4). Nevertheless as the 21st century dawns, greater than 90% of Americans continue to believe in the existence of God;² and among these believers 84% are Christian (ARDA, Q: RELPREF-96OHUT; Barna March 6, 2000, July 9, 2001). Moreover, Americans continue to express the influence of Christian religious beliefs on their political life: 74% of Americans agree or agree strongly that “...it would be better for the country if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office” (Q: RELPUBOF-ENDTIME). Nearly 37% report that their religious beliefs/values “completely” guide their voting decisions, with another 17% saying this is the case “to a large degree” (Q: GUIDEVOT-HADULT); at the same time, however, 64% say that their religious values have not influenced their choices of specific candidates,
29% report this is “somewhat” the case, and only 10% claim their religious values influence their choice of candidates “a great deal” (Q: RELPOL-MAS81B).

During the 1960s, liberal Christian beliefs became dominant in American national politics (Fowler 19-22), playing a vital role, for example, in the Civil Rights Movement and the extension of the national welfare system (President Johnson's "Great Society"). By the 1970s, however, after lying dormant for some 50 years, theologically-conservative Christian beliefs reemerged as an important motivator of Americans to compete for public offices and policies:

...those who now make their political views known through organizational vehicles such as the Moral Majority, the PTL club, or the Christian Voice ... have mobilized in a purposive crusade to defend and promote the traditional moral and social values—in essence, values of belonging to a lifetime mate, to a family, to a community, to a country, to God—that seem to them to have been marginalized in classroom curricula, in entertainment, and news media, in political discourse, and in public policy alike. No less marginalized were the role models and the institutions revered by fundamentalists. John Lennon proclaimed the Beatles “more popular than Christ.” Madalyn Murray O’Hair persuaded the Warren Court to secularize what had begun as a “Christian Republic.” Soldiers who fought for their country in an unpopular war were reviled by their countrymen as killers. And presidents were hounded from office. Television evangelists who preached the gospel and saved lost souls seemed to be under microscopic scrutiny, while Madonna, rap artists, and heavy metal groups made millions peddling blasphemy and unwholesome values to impressionable youth (Maggiotto and Wekkin 66-67).

Researchers have examined the resurgence in politics at the national level and in some states of Americans with theologically-conservative Christian beliefs, but to date no such research has been conducted in Arkansas. Nor has there been any study of the socialization of young persons’ religious beliefs and how these are associated with their political orientations in Arkansas or elsewhere in the nation.

In this work, we examine the theological orientations and religiosity of high school seniors in a Southern state, Arkansas, and the relation of these beliefs with their political orientations. To be sure, pre-adult political socialization is not the all-determining requisite of adult political behavior
that some early researchers (Hess and Torney 220) claimed. Nonetheless it provides a structuring of attitudes and beliefs that form the initial basis for adults’ political activities and evaluations of the political system's performance (Sears and Valentino 45-64). Teenagers in America today express belief in Christianity at a rate very similar to that of adults (mid-80%), and 82% of teenagers acknowledge parents as role models for their religious beliefs (Barna, October 23, 2000, 1-2). The latest cohort of young adults, then, entering the political world is an important indicator of future societal orientations between religion and politics.

Research Literature and Expectations/Hypotheses

The South has traditionally been considered the United States’ most unique region, possessing a character that requires separate analysis where politics are concerned. It is the region that has experienced the most change in partisan affinity and voting behavior over the last forty years (Black and Black, 1987, 1992, 2003; Bullock and Rozell 1998, 2002); it is considered the “vital” electoral key to winning the White House (Black and Black, 1992); it is the region in which much of the nation’s post-industrial economic growth—specifically, in agriculture, services, military spending, and technology—has taken place (Bartley and Graham, 1975; Sale 1976; Black and Black 1987); it is the region of the nation in which African-American population is at its greatest, and in which African-American voting strength and office-holding has experienced the most growth and success since the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965, respectively (Stanley 1987; Joint Center for Political Research, 1994; Black 1998); and it is the "bible belt"—the home base of the nation’s fastest growing and most conservative (ecclesiastically as well as politically) Protestant denominations. Together, these coterminous social, economic, and political changes that have
rocked the South make it an important laboratory in which to study and understand the interactive relationships between religion and politics and social issues.

The role of the religious right (or, Christian conservatives) in contemporary Southern politics is reflexively related to such changes, and can be interpreted as an attempt to defend and/or advance traditional, core Southern values vis-a-vis the corrosive effects of modernization. Theories seeking to explain the rise of the Christian Right consist of social group, value-centric, and institutional explanations that mesh together nicely, rather than setting off in separate directions. In a nutshell, a confluence of growing resources (i.e., social capital) for civic participation (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980), equilibrium disturbing events and issues (Truman 1951), and interest group entrepreneurs (Salisbury 1969) each bestirred these conservative Christian worshipers essentially simultaneously.

Much of the Christian right in the South is composed of denominations that are categorized as evangelical Protestant (although not all of the Christian right is evangelical, and not all evangelicals belong to the Christian right). Traditionally less formally educated, less affluent, and less interested and involved in politics (but more pro-Democrat when involved) than other Southern whites, theologically conservative Christians in the South have been touched by modernization along with the rest of the region. Although they may still lag behind whites of other denominations on most measures of economic success, as conservative Christians have increased their numbers in the middle class, they have gained access to resources—such as disposable income, information, free time, access to government officials and social networks—that facilitate political participation.

Clearly, however, those who now make their political views known through such conservative Christian vehicles as the PTL Club or The Christian Voice have been mobilized in a
purposive crusade to defend and promote the traditional moral and social values—in essence, values of belonging to a lifetime mate, to a family, to a country, to God—that seem to them to have been marginalized in classroom curricula, in entertainment and news media, in political discourse, and in public policy alike. No less marginalized were the role models and institutions revered by Christian conservatives: soldiers who fought for their country in Vietnam were reviled, a conservative president was forced to resign, the Beatles proclaimed themselves more popular than Christ, and television evangelists were placed under microscopic scrutiny, while heavy metal groups and rap artists made millions demeaning women, law officers, and others in lyrics laced with violence and expletives. As “black power,” “Chicano power,” “gender power” and “gay power” received attention to their symbolic and substantive demands, to conservative Christians, the political dogma of multicultural diversity seemed to include something for everyone but people like themselves.

Even as such marginalization occurred, however, the theologically conservative churches as institutions were modernizing and developing along with their followers. Congregations and their sanctuaries grew bigger as the faithful grew more prosperous. Seminary-trained pastors replaced devout, earnest yeomen in the pulpit, and these professional clergy managed the expansion of church missions to include electronic outreach, Christian education, day care, and counseling services in addition to the saving of souls and the preaching of gospel. All of this served to bring formerly small churches suddenly within the reach of the regulatory state. “The result was a series of classic confrontations between the state’s interest in the regulation of the private provision of social services and the churches’ claims of immunity under the free exercise clause” (Wald 208-209). No longer able to escape politics in any case, leaders of such churches then used their parishioners’ concern about the condition of modern life, as well as about church-state issues, to build a political
movement that would protect the institutional interests of their rapidly growing denominations. The intersection of theology and ideology thus mobilized the resources of conservative Christian church-goers to try to set the Republic straight again by injecting a Christian viewpoint into the national political discourse, building their voting strength in the process to levels that were attractive to a Republican party seeking to broaden its political base in the historically Democratic-dominated South.

The question of “secularization”—that is, the declining influence of religious authority over the scope and structure of human existence—has been central to, but not limited to, Southern politics since the middle of the twentieth century. Secularization inevitably becomes a social as well as a political issue anywhere economic and social development has taken place sufficiently to enable human concern for the material quality of life in this world to compete for attention with human concern for the spiritual quality of life in this world (and, by extension, the next). This lies at the heart of the social and political unrest of Islamic fundamentalists in the still-developing countries of the Middle and Near East, just as it lies at the heart of the recently mobilized “Christian conservative” political movement in the most recently developing region of the United States, the South. Daniel Elazar’s well-known theory of political culture in America depicts the political culture of the Southern states as “traditionalistic“ in the sense that its political ideal is the (romanticized) past, when life focused as much or more on gaining the kingdom in “the next world" as it did on material existence in "this world, “ and the raison d’etre of politics is therefore the protection and promotion of traditional values, such as love of God, country, family, and place of origin (home), respectively. The Christian conservative political movement, like country music, gospel music, and the “agrarian“ school of literature (James Dickey, Robert Penn Warren, et al.),
may be seen as a popular expression of the preferability of such traditional values to the more upwardly mobile, cosmopolitan, but relatively anonymous and alienated ways of life in the nation's most developed region, the urban industrial corridor of the northeastern and Great Lakes states, where Elazar notes that politics is "individualistic" in the sense that its focus is on the present—the quality of life in this world, not the next—and it is practiced for material gain, i.e., "to get ahead," in urban machine environs such as Boston's "North End," Tammany's Manhattan, Frank Hague's Jersey City, Green's Philadelphia, Daley's Chicago, and Pendergast's Kansas City.

The fact that the popular appeal of Christian conservatism, country music, gospel music, and agrarian literature is not limited to but extends beyond the "bible belt" of the Southern United States clarifies the longitudinal nature of the process by which cultural expressions of concern arise about the decline of traditional values, including the role of religious authority in our lives. One has only to review the sociological novels of Sinclair Lewis (Elmer Gantry, Main Street, Dombey and Son), and the fire-and-brimstone sermons of Jonathan Edwards to Revolutionary-era congregants, to encounter angst about similar crises of the spirit among the burghers of early 20th century middle America and the colonists of late 18th century America. Those regions developed and wrestled with Mammon earlier; now it is the South's turn. Development of any kind—economic, social, or otherwise—always represents a challenge to traditional values insofar as the social monopoly formerly enjoyed by traditional values is replaced by a social marketplace in which new paradigms compete with the old for adoption. Culture war is the result, as those who fear that traditional values and their adherents (i.e., themselves) will be marginalized should a new paradigm prevail organize for the more effective expression of the old paradigm. This is what gives rise to Christian conservatism or the "Religious Right" in America and Islamic fundamentalism in the Near and
Middle East. "Secularization"—the decline of the social authority of religion over human life—in so many words is the product of development.

In Arkansas theologically-conservative Christianity became politically influential during the early part of the 20th century (Dougan 1994; Ferguson and Atkinson 1966). But, like other Southern states during the second half of the 20th century, Arkansas experienced a liberalizing transformation that resulted in a “new Southern politics” (Bass and DeVries 1976). This transformation consisted of replacing parochial racial segregationists with racial integrationists who have promoted economic development that connects Arkansas with national and international markets.

Simultaneous with the modernizing "new Southern politics" has been a secularizing and/or liberalizing of public life and public policies. In opposition to this, Americans with conservative theological beliefs have organized for political action throughout the Southern bible belt (indeed, the nation). Unlike earlier generations, the current generation of theologically-conservative activists possess higher socioeconomic status and utilize the Republican rather than the Democratic Party as their institutional vehicle, but like their earlier brethren they remain politically conservative (Kellstedt and Noll 372-374; Wald 257; Wilcox 3-4, 74-77).

Hypotheses/Expectations. It is reasonable to argue that religious values are more basic to the human psyche than are political beliefs and therefore that religious values are precursors of political involvement rather than vice versa. And while this may be so, the direction of the impact of religious values on political orientations is not consistent: On the one hand, liberal or even radical leftests have claimed Christian motivation; on the other, political conservatives also have claimed Christian religious motives (Wald 201-206). Adding to the mixture of potential causes and effects is that participation in religious organizations may also influence political orientations and political activities. Here the "participation hypothesis" is operative. It projects that involvement in some
organization (say a church or a labor union) will generate a "spillover" effect that enhances activities in related situations (Peterson 123-125). Involvement in religious organizations, then, not only provides opportunities to practice civic skills, but also may expose participants to political stimuli, thereby reinforcing political values and attitudes (Verba, Lehman Schlozman, and Brady 381).

Evidence appears to confirm that the congregational-type organization typical of Protestant churches provides opportunity for involvement: theologically conservative Protestants (and Mormons) participate at the highest level in the religious activities in their churches, mainline Protestants next, and Catholics are the least involved in their churches’ activities (Barna, July 9, 2001, 6).

Thus compared with Protestants, Catholics would appear to have less organizational encouragement to participate in the life of the Church and, subsequently, to have less political stimulation from involvement in church activities. Additionally, Catholic students attending Catholic high schools are exposed in their daily school environment to the Catholic Church’s conservative theological approach concerning the role of women in the Church and family, anti-abortion, and emphasis on acceptance of hierarchical Church authority. On the other hand, Catholic high schools’ emphasis on a college-preparatory curriculum (Mano, Jan.1999) may produce an emphasis on political knowledge and participation for all citizens regardless of gender; furthermore, the American Catholic Bishops' pronouncements on nuclear disarmament and the recent reorientation of the Catholic Church's leadership in America toward support of liberal social and economic policies, except abortion, (Hanna ch 2; Wald 272-293) may enhance Catholic students’ political interest and activities.

**Control Variables.** In analyzing the relationship between the religious values/beliefs of these high school seniors and their political orientations, it is important to examine the impact that
other variables may be exerting. Literature identifies three variables that may independently influence religious beliefs-values and/or political orientations, and therefore should be examined carefully. These are race, sex, and socioeconomic status: Socialization has produced political and religious orientations among African Americans that differ from those of white Americans (Clark and Wekkin). Additionally, the socialization of females may differ from males (Conway, Steuernagel, and Ahern 21), possibly producing divergent political and/or religious values; if so, this would most likely occur in a traditional state such as Arkansas (Elazar 1972; Scott 1970). 

Meanwhile, family socioeconomic status exerts a pervasive influence on the values of youth.

Higher family socioeconomic status, especially parental education, has been shown to be important in providing offspring with background resources for developing higher political interest and acquiring institutional positions that enhance their political participation (Verba, et al, 458-459). In general, higher socioeconomic status (SES) is associated with Republican Party identification (Janda, Berry and Goldman 257), as well as with more conservative political views (260); however, these general relationships of SES and political orientations are qualified by gender and race.

Women are decidedly more religious and involved in church activities (other than as senior pastors or priests) than men (Barna, March 6, 2000, 1). However, regardless of socioeconomic status, women express less interest and lower participation in politics (except voting) than men (Conway, Steuernagel, and Ahern 21, 88; Bennett and Bennett 116-117; Verba et al. 345-346). And while women in the general population are more likely to be Democrats than are men, among theologically conservative Christians both white women and white men are more likely to be Republican and politically more conservative than mainstream theologically liberal whites (Barna, March 21, 2000, 2).
We expect/hypothesize that the white female and male students in our sample will express similar religious and political orientations to those described in the preceding paragraph as characteristic of their adult counterparts.

African Americans are more likely to express belief in God (ARDA, Q: BLVINGOD-96KOHUT), to belong to a church, and to attend more frequently than white Americans (Fowler 311). Politically, African Americans are: self-identified overwhelmingly as Democrats (Wald 176), strongly oriented toward a liberal political philosophy (even when of conservative religious outlook) (177), express higher levels of alienation from the political system than whites (Jennings and Niemi 127, 142-143; Verba et al 228-268), and have lower levels of political interest and participation than whites (Verba et al 231-235). The socioeconomic status of African Americans does not affect their religiosity and/or political orientations as it does among whites (Peterson132).

We expect/hypothesize that female and male African-American high students in our sample will express similar religious and political orientations as those described in the preceding paragraph as characteristic of adult African Americans.

**Methods, Measurement, and Data**

We replicated Jennings and Niemi’s 1973 nationwide survey, with additional questions attached. The questions employed in this study and their coding are presented in the Appendix. Jennings and Niemi’s survey contained two questions tapping religion: One measured frequency of church attendance (see Appendix question 2); we employ it to indicate religiosity. The other question asked denominational affiliation (see Appendix question 1); from it we create our measures of theologically Conservative Protestants, Mainstream Protestants, and Catholics: We group Methodists, Lutherans, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, Congregationalists, and A.M.E. into the category that we name “theologically mainstream Protestant”; we group Baptists, Pentecostal,
Assembly of God, Church of God, Church of the Nazarene, and Church of Christ into the category that we name “theologically conservative Protestants.” The denominations contained in our two groupings are very close, if not identical, to the classifications commonly recognized as differentiating conservative and mainstream theological orientations among the Protestant denominations (Wald 173). Lastly, Jennings and Niemi’s question on denominational affiliation contains a category of Catholics, the third religious orientation that we study.

Students’ family socioeconomic status (SES) is measured by their self-reported annual family income, along with their report of their mothers’ and fathers’ education; and, students’ political values—American government is best, public officials do not care, ideology (conservative), party identification, support for free speech, interest in government and politics, involvement in the 1996 election, and anticipated future political involvement—are measured by questions employed by Jennings and Niemi (see Appendix).

The sample consists of 703 high school seniors from seven schools in central Arkansas. Four of the schools are public and three are Catholic. One of the three Catholic high schools is all-female, another is all-male, and the third one is co-educational. Three of the schools have significant minority enrollments (at 15% or greater), although overall only 5.5% of the total sample is African American. Two of the schools are located in an urban setting of 170,000 inhabitants, two are located in an urban setting of 45,000 inhabitants, one is located in a small city of 7,000 inhabitants, and two are located in small towns of 1-2,000 inhabitants.

Once the cooperation of school authorities was obtained for the project, questionnaires replicating Jennings and Niemi's 1973 questionnaire, with additional questions pertinent to contemporary issues and social and technological changes appended after the original survey protocol, were provided to the high schools in early May, 1997. The questionnaires were
administered to graduating seniors by teachers at the schools. During the process of scrutinizing our data, we omitted questionnaires that contained significant omission of questions, confused responses such as multiple answers to questions requiring only one answer, response-sets, or other indications of insincere responses.

A Word About the Sample. Catholics are overrepresented in the sample because three of the seven high schools are Catholic. Comprising less than 2% of the general population in Arkansas, Catholic students comprise 37% of the theological groups studied here, theologically-conservative Protestants 43%, and theologically-mainstream Protestants 20%. Overrepresentation of an otherwise small subset is a method to improve confidence in comparisons of it with other larger subsets of a population; in this case, Catholics compared with theologically-conservative Protestants and with theologically-mainstream Protestants.
Regrettably, however, African Americans are underrepresented in the sample (5.5%) compared with the general population of the state (about 16%), thereby reducing confidence in our analyses of them. (African Americans are underrepresented because we were not able to secure permission to conduct the survey at any of the Little Rock public schools.) Nonetheless, we include the African-American students in our analysis, because Table 1 suggests that they reflect accurately the overwhelmingly conservative theological orientations of African Americans in Arkansas; and, as later evidence will demonstrate, they also reflect the political orientations of adult African Americans. The small sample size does not permit us to perform separate analyzes of African-American females and males in the later section reporting correlations (Table 6); instead, we must combine them into a single group. With this caveat of the potential problem for statistical analysis that our small sample of African Americans presents, we include them in the analysis.

| Table 1. Distributions of the Three Theological Orientations By Race and Sex |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Catholic                        | 10%              | 09%             | 33%             | 47%             |
| Conservative Protestant         | 90%              | 65%             | 42%             | 36%             |
| Mainstream Protestant           | 0%               | 26%             | 25%             | 17%             |

The total sample (N=703) contains a distribution that has a slightly higher proportion of males (52%) than females (48%); this is because among the seven schools surveyed, the all-male school is somewhat larger than the all-female school (the other five schools are co-educational with approximately the same proportions of female and male students). The proportion of females to males in the sample does not create a problem for analysis.

Analyses of the data are conducted by frequency distributions (Tables 1-5) and by correlation techniques (Table 6) (see Endnote#18 for details of the latter).
Results

Religiosity Distribution

Church attendance is high among our respondents (Tables 2&3): 49% claim to attend church almost every week, while 24% attend once or twice a month, 15% attend a few times per year, and 12% never attend church. Mainstream Protestants averaged the lowest church attendance (mean=3.22; range: Highest=4, Lowest=1; see Appendix for coding), theologically-conservative Protestants next to the highest (mean=3.02), and Catholics averaged the highest church attendance (mean=3.40); however, these Catholic students had the obligation to attend services during the school week at the Catholic Church associated with their high school, thereby inflating their average.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency of Church Attendance</th>
<th>African-American Catholic Females (N=2)</th>
<th>African-American Mainline Protestant Females (N=0)</th>
<th>African-American Conservative Protestant Females (N=18)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Few Times a Year</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once or Twice a Month</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almost Every Week</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.56%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, while church attendance is high among all groupings, as hypothesized African Americans expressed an overall higher rate of church attendance (mean=3.23) than did the white students (mean=3.16); and females overall—as hypothesized—reported slightly higher church attendance (mean=3.16) than males (mean=3.14). But, somewhat surprisingly, the theologically-mainstream Protestants had a higher rate of church attendance than did the theologically-conservative Protestants, while Catholic students’ rate was inflated by church attendance at school.
Students’ Political Values

As a whole, the students express high support for the American system of government (Table 4). As expected, white theologically-conservative Protestants (TCPs) exhibit the highest support for the American governmental system as the best for all other countries: overall, 72% of TCPs agree or agree strongly; females more so (74%) than males (69%). African-American students express the next highest agreement that the American system is best for all countries (65%), but with considerably higher support from males (74%) than females (56%). White theologically-mainstream Protestants (TMPs) are next to the lowest (62%) supporters, males (70%) expressing much higher support than females (56%). White Catholics display the lowest support for American government as the best type for all other countries (55%); among these Catholic females, less than half (43%) agree, whereas 63% of Catholic males support the American governmental system as best for all countries.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEPENDENT VARIABLES</th>
<th>African-American Protestants*</th>
<th>White Theologically Conservative Protestants</th>
<th>White Theologically Mainstream Protestants</th>
<th>White Catholics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Female N= 18; Male N=21)</td>
<td>(Female N=93; Males N=84)</td>
<td>(Female N= 54; Male N= 40)</td>
<td>(Female N= 72; Male N=</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence in the American System</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The American Govt System Is Best</td>
<td>Overall: Agree=65%; Rank=2</td>
<td>Overall: Agree = 72%; Rank=1</td>
<td>Overall: Agree = 62%; Rank=3</td>
<td>Overall: Agree = 55%; Rank= 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Females 56%</td>
<td>Females 74%</td>
<td>Females 56%</td>
<td>Females 43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males 74%</td>
<td>Males 69%</td>
<td>Males 70%</td>
<td>Males 63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Officials Don’t Care</td>
<td>Overall: Agree=87%; Rank=1</td>
<td>Overall: Agree = 74%; Rank=2</td>
<td>Overall: Agree = 54%; Rank=3</td>
<td>Overall: Agree = 63%; Rank= 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Females 83%</td>
<td>Females 77%</td>
<td>Females 45%</td>
<td>Females 60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males 90%</td>
<td>Males 70%</td>
<td>Males 65%</td>
<td>Males 64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politziation</td>
<td>Overall: Yes=16%; Rank=4</td>
<td>Overall: Yes = 25%; Rank=1</td>
<td>Overall: Yes = 18%; Rank=3</td>
<td>Overall: Yes = 19%; Rank= 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Females 24%</td>
<td>Females 28%</td>
<td>Females 19%</td>
<td>Females 13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males 10%</td>
<td>Males 23%</td>
<td>Males 18%</td>
<td>Males 23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Party Identifier</td>
<td>Overall: Yes=28%; Rank=2</td>
<td>Overall: Yes = 34%; Rank=1</td>
<td>Overall: Yes = 22%; Rank=4</td>
<td>Overall: Yes = 28%; Rank= 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Females 28%</td>
<td>Females 33%</td>
<td>Females 23%</td>
<td>Females 25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males 29%</td>
<td>Males 36%</td>
<td>Males 30%</td>
<td>Males 30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for Anti-Religious Speech</td>
<td>Overall: Agree=64%; Rank=4</td>
<td>Overall: Agree = 71%; Rank=3</td>
<td>Overall: Agree = 87%; Rank=1</td>
<td>Overall: Agree = 87%; Rank= 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Females 67%</td>
<td>Females 70%</td>
<td>Females 89%</td>
<td>Females 93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males 62%</td>
<td>Males 73%</td>
<td>Males 85%</td>
<td>Males 84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interested in Politics and Govt</td>
<td>Overall: Yes=53%; Rank=4</td>
<td>Overall: Yes = 60%; Rank=2</td>
<td>Overall: Yes = 55%; Rank=3</td>
<td>Overall: Yes= 64%; Rank= 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Females 56%</td>
<td>Females 58%</td>
<td>Females 46%</td>
<td>Females 51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males 50%</td>
<td>Males 62%</td>
<td>Males 66%</td>
<td>Males 73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involved in 1996 Campaign</td>
<td>Overall: Yes=32%; Rank=1</td>
<td>Overall: Yes = 17%; Rank=4</td>
<td>Overall: Yes = 30%; Rank=2</td>
<td>Overall: Yes = 29%; Rank= 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Females 35%</td>
<td>Females 15%</td>
<td>Females 25%</td>
<td>Females 31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males 29%</td>
<td>Males 20%</td>
<td>Males 38%</td>
<td>Males 29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected Activism in Future</td>
<td>Overall: Yes=28%; Rank=4</td>
<td>Overall: Yes = 32%; Rank=2</td>
<td>Overall: Yes = 37%; Rank=1</td>
<td>Overall: Yes = 25%; Rank= 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Females 22%</td>
<td>Females 29%</td>
<td>Females 35%</td>
<td>Females 23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males 33%</td>
<td>Males 35%</td>
<td>Males 38%</td>
<td>Males 27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note on the interpretation of the cells: The “Overall” line in each cell is the distribution in percent of all respondents within a theological perspective on the given political orientation and the rank of that theological orientation for that dependent variable; the percentage distributions are then broken down for females and the males within that theological perspective, and displayed under the headings “Females” and “Males.” Thus for the first cell, Overall 65% of African-American Protestants agreed or agreed strongly that the American system of government is best for all countries with an Overall rank of 2nd on support for the American governmental system as best; among African-American females 56% agreed with this statement, while 74% of African-American male students agreed with it. * For African-American students the number of females and males in the separate theological orientations are too small for meaningful separate calculations; therefore, all female and male Protestant African-American students are combined in this table. The four Catholic African-American students (two females and two males) are excluded from this table.
Legend: a = “strongly agree” or “agree” that American govt system is best; b = “strongly agree” or “agree” that public officials do not care; c = “conservative”; d = “strong” or “weak” Republican identifier; e = “strongly agree” or “agree” that someone should be allowed to give an anti-religious speech; f = “most” or “some” of the time; g = “yes, very” or “yes, but not very” involved in 1996 campaign; h = expects to be “pretty” or “very” active in future politics. See the Appendix for the questions and their coding.
The students believe that public officials do not care what citizens think. Not unexpectedly, African-American students feel this way the most strongly (87%), especially males (90%), but the view is widely shared by African-American females (83%). This is to be expected in light of the adult African-American perception. That TCPs express the next highest belief that public officials do not care is also well within expectations: overall 74% of TCPs agree that officials do not care what people think; TCP females are somewhat more dubious (77%) than males (70%). Adult TCPs are motivated politically by their reaction to the belief that the national (and many state) governments are not responding to their politically conservative agenda, and these young TCPs reflect this. White Catholics are next to the least inclined to perceive public officials as uncaring (54%); the males among them are a bit more likely to perceive this (64%) than the females (60%). White TMPs are least likely to believe that public officials do not care (54%); however, a large difference exists between the TMP females and males: less than half of these females (45%) perceive public officials as uncaring, whereas 65% of the TMP males do.

Political conservatism is not high among these students. But as expected the most politically conservative are the white TCPs (25%); the females among them are somewhat more so (28%) than the males (23%). White Catholics are next most politically conservative (19%); but Catholic females much less so (13%) than Catholic males (23%). At 18% TMPs are next to the least politically conservative; TMP females (19%) and males (18%) exhibiting nearly identical rates. African-American students are least politically conservative (16%), although the African-American females are considerably more conservative (24%) than the males (10%).

Republican Party identification is not high among any of the groupings of students. As expected, it is highest among the TCPs (34%), with almost no difference between TCP females
African Americans and Catholics tied for second-most Republican, although both are low Republican identifiers—each displaying an overall 28%. Among African Americans, females (28%) and males (29%) displayed almost the same Republican identification rates; whereas among white Catholics, females (25%) are somewhat less inclined to identify themselves as Republican than Catholic males (30%). TMPs are the lowest identifiers with the Republican Party (22%); among them, little difference exists between the females (23%) and males (20%) rates of Republican identification.

Noteworthy is that students most strongly identify themselves as Independents (39%) and Democratic Party identification is 33% (slightly higher than Republican); these distributions of students’ political party identification are similar to national samples (Bardes, Shelley, and Schmidt, 2002), as well as to adults in Arkansas (Parry, Schreckhise, Shields, and Williams, Nov. 16, 1999).

Support for freedom to make anti-religious speeches is high among the students in all the religious groupings, although the range is fairly large. White TMPs and white Catholics provide the highest support (87%), with females in each group more supportive than males (TMP females 89%, TMP males 85%; Catholic females 93%, Catholic males 84%). White TCPs are next to the least supportive of anti-religious speech (71%), females (70%) and males (73%) being nearly the same. African-American students are least supportive of anti-religious speech (64%); African-American females are more supportive of anti-religious speech (67%), than males (62%).

Interest in politics and government is reasonably high among all the groupings of students. White Catholics are the most interested (64%), but with a very large difference between Catholic females (51%) and males (73%). Among the second most politically interested grouping, white TCPs (60%), males are somewhat more interested (62%) than females (58%). The next to the least interested in politics and government are TMPs (55%); here females are very significantly less
interested (46%) compared with males (66%). African-American students are least interested (53%), but unlike the other groupings, among African-Americans females are somewhat more interested (56%) than their male counterparts (50%).

Involvement in the 1996 elections is low among all these 1997 classes high school seniors. The highest participants were the African-American students (32%), among whom females were somewhat more politically active (35%) compared with the African-American males (29%). White TMPs were the next highest participants (30%), but females were much less likely to participate (25%) than males (38%). White Catholics at 29% were third; the females among them participated at a somewhat higher rate (31%) than the males (29%). The TCPs students exhibit the lowest participation (17%) in the 1996 election; TCP females (15%) participating somewhat less than the males (20%).

Finally, these students do not expect to be very active in future politics. White TMPs anticipate the highest future political involvement (37%), with females among them expecting to be somewhat less involved (35%) than males (38%). White TCPs anticipate future political involvement at the next highest level (32%); here females (35%) expect to be a little less active than males (38%). African Americans predict being involved in future politics next to last among the groups (28%); African-American females expect to be much less active (22%) than do African-American males (33%). White Catholics anticipate being the least active in future politics (25%); Catholic females (23%) less so than Catholic males (27%).

Relationships Among the Dependent and Independent Variables

**Political Values and Religiosity.** Frequency of church attendance—our indication of religiosity—generally impacts in the expected direction (Table 5).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Attends Church Almost Every Week (N=313)</th>
<th>Attends Church Once or Twice A Month (N=153)</th>
<th>Attends Church A Few Times Per Year (N=96)</th>
<th>Never Attends Church (N=73)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CONFIDENCE IN POLITICAL SYSTEM</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The American Govt System Is Best&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Officials Don’t Care&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IDEOLOGY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for Anti-Religious Speech&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>POLITICIZATION</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Party Identifier&lt;sup&gt;e&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interested in Politics and Govt&lt;sup&gt;f&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involved in 1996 Campaigns&lt;sup&gt;g&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected Activism in Future&lt;sup&gt;h&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend: a = “strongly agree” or “agree” that American govt system is best for all countries; b = “strongly agree” or “agree” that public officials do not care; c = “conservative”; d = “strong” or “weak” Republican identifier; e = “strongly agree” or “agree” that anyone should be allowed to give an anti-religious speech; f = “most” or “some” of the time; g = “yes, very” or “yes, but not very” involved in 1996 campaign; h = expects to be “pretty” or “very” active in future politics. See Appendix for specific wording and coding of questions.

Higher church-goers think the American system best for all countries, while those who never attend church are the least inclined to think so; but church-goers and nonchurch-goers overwhelmingly believe that public officials do not care what they think. Church-goers are more politically conservative, more likely to be Republican, and more interested in politics compared to non-attenders. Church-goers are somewhat less likely to permit speech against religion than nonchurch-goers. Church attendance did not matter for students’ present or their anticipated political
Table 6. Zero Order Correlations of Independent and Dependent Variables by Race, Sex, and Religious Orientations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variables</th>
<th>Independent Variables:</th>
<th>Family</th>
<th>Mothers’ Education</th>
<th>Fathers’ Education</th>
<th>Church Attendance</th>
<th>Family</th>
<th>Mothers’ Education</th>
<th>Fathers’ Education</th>
<th>Church Attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American Govt Best</td>
<td></td>
<td>.076</td>
<td>-.084</td>
<td>.076</td>
<td>.151</td>
<td>-.070</td>
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<td>.120</td>
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<td>.205</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>-.161</td>
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<td>-.028</td>
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<td>-.026</td>
<td>.069</td>
<td>.047</td>
<td>.060</td>
<td>.089</td>
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<td>Republican Party Identifier</td>
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<td>-.151</td>
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<td>.097</td>
<td>.076</td>
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<td>.263*</td>
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<td>-.073</td>
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<td>.151</td>
<td>.120</td>
<td>-.127</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Dependent Variables</td>
<td>Independent Variables:</td>
<td>Family</td>
<td>Mothers’ Education</td>
<td>Fathers’ Education</td>
<td>Church Attendance</td>
<td>Family</td>
<td>Mothers’ Education</td>
<td>Fathers’ Education</td>
<td>Church Attendance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Govt Best</td>
<td></td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>-.027</td>
<td>.119</td>
<td>.044</td>
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<td>.243</td>
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<td>Public Officials Don’t Care</td>
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<td>Dependent Variables</td>
<td>Independent Variables:</td>
<td>Family</td>
<td>Mothers’ Education</td>
<td>Fathers’ Education</td>
<td>Church Attendance</td>
<td>Family</td>
<td>Mothers’ Education</td>
<td>Fathers’ Education</td>
<td>Church Attendance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.016</td>
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<td>.061</td>
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<td>.212*</td>
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<td>.082</td>
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<td>.047</td>
<td>.084</td>
<td>-.044</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

* The correlation coefficients in this table are Tau bs except “Involved in 1996 Campaign” which is a Tau c (because the number of rows and columns are unequal); see Endnote#18.

* An asterisk indicates statistical significance at ≤.05.
participation (Table 5).

**Correlations.** The relationship of the independent variables (mothers’ education, fathers’ education, family SES, and frequency of church attendance) and the dependent variables (American government as best, public officials do not care, political conservatism, Republican identification, support for anti-religious speech, interest in politics, involvement in 1996 campaign, and future political activism) are examined initially by use of bivariate correlations (Table 6).18

In general, there are only a few weak and scattered significant correlations between the independent and dependent variables—of the 224 potentially significant relationships in Table 6, only 13 are statistically significant at ≤ .05. That said, the few statistically significant relationships are in the direction expected/hypothesized.

In Table 6 there are four statistically significant (at ≤ .05) bivariate relationships between family SES and the dependent variables: 1) White female TCPs’ interest in politics and government increases somewhat with higher family SES (.216); this relationship continues when either mothers’ (partial = .293; note: see Endnote#18 for an explanation of the partial coefficients) or when fathers’ education (partial = .259) is controlled. 2) White male TCPs’ from higher SES families express more support for freedom to give anti-religious speeches (.307); this relationship continues when either mothers’ (partial = .281) or when fathers’ education (partial = .311) is controlled. 3) White female Catholics’ display significant negative belief that public officials care what citizens think as their family SES increases (.256); and while this tendency decreases slightly when either mother’s (partial = −.287) or fathers’ education (partial = .292) is controlled, the relationship remains significant. 4) White male Catholics from higher SES families are inclined to support freedom to
give anti-religious speeches (.212); and, again, this relationship holds when either mothers’ (partial = .231) or fathers’ education (partial = .167) is controlled.

Parental education is significantly related to a dependent variable in only five situations: 1) African-American students fathers’ education is associated with lower expectations of future political activities (-.400), and this relationship continues when family SES (partial = -.443) or mothers’ education (partial = -.475) is controlled. 2) White female TCPs are significantly more likely to identify with the Republican Party as their fathers’ education increases (.217); this relationship, however, disappears when mothers’ education (partial = .034) or when family SES is controlled (partial = .075), thus indicating that fathers’ education does not exert an influence on Republican Party identification independent from mothers’ education or family SES. 3) Students mothers’ education is associated among white male TMPs’ with their expectation of lower future political participation (-.272); when fathers’ education (partial = -.272) is controlled the relationship remains, as it does when family SES is controlled (partial = -.345). 4) White female Catholics support for the American governmental system decreases as their fathers’ education increases (-.293); this relationship remains when mothers’ education is controlled (partial = -.281) and when family SES is controlled (partial = -.186). 5) Also mothers’ education is related among white female Catholics’ to their higher interest in government and politics (.225); this relationship remains when father’s education (partial = .230) is controlled, and when family SES is controlled (partial = .369).

Church attendance is associated significantly four times with dependent variables: 1) among among white female TCPs with higher Republication Party identification (.263); however, this relationship disappears when mothers’ education (partial = .087) or father’s education (partial = .046) is controlled, but remains when family SES is controlled (partial = .214). 2) Church attendance is associated among white female TMPs’ with lower political conservatism (.233); and this relationship
remains—although weakened somewhat—controlling for mothers’ education (partial = .201) or fathers’ education (partial = .171) or family SES (partial = .159). 3) White female TMPs also express lower involvement in the 1996 campaign as their church attendance increases (-.233); and this relationship remains when their mothers’ education (partial = -.357) or their fathers’ education (partial = -.326) or their family SES (partial = -.241) is controlled. 4) Finally, white female Catholics expressed significantly less support for freedom to give anti-religious speeches as their church attendance increases (-.216); and this remains significant when mothers’ education (partial = -.265) is controlled and remains, though diminished somewhat, when either fathers’ education (partial = -.196) or family SES (partial = -.216) is controlled.

In brief, then, there are only a few significant bivariate relationships of weak strength, which—when the SES variables (family income, mothers’ education, and fathers’ education) are controlled—produce no consistent or pervasive pattern of association among any of these SES variables and the dependent variables (American government best, public officials don’t care, conservative ideology, Republican identification, support anti-religious speech, interested in politics and government, involved in 1996 campaign, and expectation of future political participation); this same situation exists for religiosity and the dependent variables.

Conclusions

Among these Southern high school seniors, the religiosity and political beliefs of theologically-conservative Protestants are compared with theologically-mainstream Protestants and Catholics; and the impact of race, sex, and family SES on students’ political orientations are examined. The expectation/hypotheses was that these high school seniors would reflect their socialization by exhibiting political values similar to those reported in research literature for their adult-population counterparts; indeed, the students do display the political orientations
expected/hypothesized. This commonality of religious and political beliefs implies a common and pervasive political socialization experience, although neither the specific agents (i.e., parents, school, media, etc) nor their specific influence can be identified.

With respect to the general findings, these high school seniors are quite religious—as we would expect from the Arkansas religious practices; and politically they tend to express strong belief in the American governmental system as best, but do not believe that public officials care or listen to people; they are politically more conservative than liberal (but most—around 40%—are “middle-of-the-roaders,” as are young persons throughout the nation), and are slightly more likely to be Democrats than Republicans (although the plurality—39%—are Independents, as are young persons throughout the nation); they display limited interest in politics, and have not been involved in political campaigns, nor do they expect to be much involved in future politics. This set of political attitudes/beliefs is characteristic of adult Americans throughout the nation.

More specifically, as expected/hypothesized, white theologically-conservative Protestants rank first and second on most of the variables: first in support for the American governmental system as best for all counties, second (behind African Americans) in distrust of public officials, first in political conservatism, first in identification with the Republican Party, third (African Americans were least inclined) in support for freedom to give anti-religious speeches, second in interest in politics and government, but last in involvement in the 1996 election, although second in expectations of future political activity level. These rankings—except the low participation in the 1996 elections—are expected in light of the research findings for adult theologically-conservative Protestants reported in the Literature section.
The young African Americans in our sample (see the “Methods, Measurement, and Data” section for a caveat) exhibit the theologically-conservative religious orientations of adult African Americans, along with the political orientations characteristic of them. Within our sample, the African American students rank second in support for the American governmental system, first in distrust of public officials, last in political conservatism, second in identification with the Republican Party (but low, and are first in identification with the Democratic Party), last in support for anti-religious speech, last in interest in government and politics, first in participation in the 1996 elections (not unexpected given the liberal political activism common to African-American churches [Wald 217, 304-310]), and last in expectation of future political activities.

Some differences between females and males are notable: compared to their male counterparts, white females tend to be less interested in politics, to have been less involved in politics, and expect to be less involved in the future politics than males; at the same time, African-American females compared with their African-American male counterparts express lower interest and do not expect to be as involved in future politics, but were more involved in the 1996 campaign than their African-American male counterparts.

Family SES—mothers’ education, fathers’ education, family income—do not make much difference in the political orientations of these high school seniors. There are only a few scattered (i.e., not systematic) and weak associations among these measures of family SES and the students’ political values. Moreover, the students’ religiosity—their frequency of church attendance—does not impact importantly on their political values; religiosity exhibits only a few scattered, weak correlations with the political orientations.

The political orientations of these Southern high school students are much more alike than different regardless of the different theological orientations, race, gender, family SES, and
religiosity, the: Neither white theological conservatives, nor African Americans, nor females differ much from their fellow high school seniors’ religiosity or their political orientations. The socialization process is producing a common denominator of religious and political beliefs among these young Southern adults, as well as generational continuity.

**Works Cited**


Appendix: Questions and Coding

(NOTE: These questions are from Jennings, M.. Kent (Principal Investigator) and Richard Niemi. *High School Seniors Cohort Study, 1965 and 1973. ICPSR Study Number 7575. Ann Arbor, MI: The Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan.*)

**Religious Questions:**
1. What is your religious preference?
   - (3) Southern Baptist, other Baptist, Pentecostal, Assembly of God, Church of God, Nazarene, Church of Christ (Coded as “Conservative Protestant”)
   - (2) Methodist, Lutheran, Presbyterian, Episcopal, United Church of Christ, Congregational, A.M.E. (Coded as “Mainstream Protestant”)
   - (1) Catholic

2. How often do you go to church?
   - (4) almost every week
   - (3) once or twice a month
   - (2) a few times per year
   - (1) never

**Demographics and SES Questions:**
3. What is your gender?
   - (1) female
   - (2) male

4. Are you: (Mark the one which best applies)
   - (1) White/Caucasion
   - (2) Black/African American
   - (3) Asian/Pacific Islander
   - (4) Hispanic American
   - (5) Native American/Alaskan

5. How far did your mother go in school?
   - (1) less than a high school diploma
   - (2) completed high school (12 years) or GED
   - (3) some college
   - (4) completed college

6. How far did your father go in school?
   - (1) less than a high school diploma
   - (2) completed high school (12 years) or GED
   - (3) some college
   - (4) completed college

7. What is your best estimate of the total income of your family (parents) last year—before taxes?
   - (1) less than $15,000
   - (2) $30,000-$29,999
   - (3) $30,000-$75,999
   - (4) $76,000 or more

**Confidence in System Questions:**
8. The American system of government is the kind all countries should have.
   - (4) strongly agree
   - (3) agree
   - (2) disagree
   - (1) strongly disagree

9. I don’t think public officials care much what people like me think.
   - (4) strongly agree
   - (3) agree
   - (2) disagree
   - (1) strongly disagree

**Ideology Questions:**
10. How would you describe your political beliefs?
    - (1) far left
    - (2) liberal
    - (3) middle-of-the-road
    - (4) conservative

11. If a person wanted to make a speech in this community against churches and religion, he should be allowed to speak.
    - (4) strongly agree
    - (3) agree
    - (2) disagree
    - (1) strongly disagree

**Politicization Questions:**
12. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent?
    - (5) strong Republican
    - (4) weak Republican
    - (3) Independent
    - (2) weak Democrat
    - (1) Strong Democrat

13. Some people seem to think about what’s going on in government all the time, whether there’s an election or not. Others aren’t that interested. How often do you follow what’s going on in government?
    - (4) most of the time
    - (3) some of the time
    - (2) only now and then
    - (1) hardly at all

14. Did you take part in any way during the 1996 election campaign?
    - (1) no
    - (2) yes, not very active
    - (3) yes, very active
Endnotes


2 In a random nationwide poll taken in summer 2001, 7% of Americans identified themselves an atheist or agnostic (Barna Research Online, www.barna.org , July 9, 2001, 1); a random national poll conducted in 2000 and recorded by the American Religion Data Archive (www.thearda.com) reports that 70.9% were absolutely certain of the existence of God, 14.3% were fairly sure, 1.7% were not at all sure, 1.2% were not certain, and that 3.9% did not believe in the existence of a God. These numbers remain quite consistent over time, for example, in 1973 the figure of self-identified atheists/agnostics was 6.4% (Hanna 1).

3 Exemplary of the theologically and politically liberal and active churches in the 1960s (and today) is a coalition of them under the rubric of the National Council of Churches (Fowler 4).

4 For a brief overview of the shifts in theology and political orientations of Christianity in 20th century America, see Marty (in Noll ed 328-333); for a discussion of the "political retreat" of theologically conservative Christian churches from politics in the 1930s, and the development of a liberal theological and political Christian mainstream, see Fowler (19-22). For the larger portrait of religion and politics in America, see endnote #1.

5 In the current discussion, the present authors employ the expression "theologically conservative Christian" as a generic term to mean not mainline "liberal" Christian theological positions; see the later Methods section for the specific definition of these terms.

6 For a listing of the organizations generated by conservative theological beliefs, as well as those created in opposition to them, see Wald (234-235).

7 For excellent reviews of this literature see Wald (1997) and Wilcox (1996, 1992).

8 Our review of Southern politics here follows closely that of Maggiotto and d Wekkin (xii-xii, 66-67)

9 Causation is not necessarily being suggested here, although modernization does generally accompany secularization; for an analytical perspective on economic development-modernization and religiosity, see Smith (1970).
10 The South has long been recognized as the “Bible Belt” where conservative theological convictions continue to be more prominent than in other regions of the nation. The Midwest is, however, a close second; see Barna Research Online (www.barna.org, March 21, 2000, 5).

11 For example, in 1991, 13% of "born again" Christians had a household income of $60,000 or more, by 2000 this was 25% (Barna Research Online, <www.barna.org>, May 30, 2000, 1). It should be noted, however, that while the percentages of persons with a born-again experience are increasingly better educated and have higher income, born-again Christians continue to have lower education and lower income than those who say that they are not born-again (see ARDA, www.thearda.com, question BRNAGN1 from 96KOHUT Custom Analysis, pp.2-3). And, Wald (1997) presents data that demonstrate "evangelical Protestants" and "Black Protestants" have the lowest educational achievement on average (192).

12 Only panel-surveys data can answer the question of whether political and/or cultural factors have motivated religious-type persons to participate in politics; see (Wilcox 230).

13 Although Elazar (1965) classifies Arkansas as overall a traditional state, Savage and Blair (1984) find attitudinal variations between and within regions of Arkansas (59-85).

14 Ninety percent of senior Protestant pastors, and 100% of Catholic priests are males (Barna Research Online, <www.barna.org>, March 6, 2000), as are 100% of Mormons holding the Melchizedek Priesthood.

15 See Jennings, Kent M. (Principal Investigator). “High School Cohort Study, 1965 and 1973,” ICPSR Study Number 7575. The Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan, P.O. Box 1248, Ann Arbor, Michigan. We replicated this study, and added some additional questions that are reported in other research (see Wekkin and Whistler 2001).

16 It should be noted that the Jennings and Niemi classification places the African-American African Methodist Episcopal Zion (A.M.E.) denomination in the Mainstream Protestant category. African Americans in Arkansas, as elsewhere, belong primarily to a variety of theologically conservative denominations, such as various Baptist churches. For example in 1990 the A.M.E. contained 0.4% of the total religious adherents in Arkansas, compared with African-American Baptists who comprised 8.5% (Bradley et al 1992).

17 Using denominations to categorize yields different results from using beliefs. Readers interested in the very difficult problems of measuring religious concepts/beliefs are directed to the discussions found in Roof (1979) and Wilson (1978). Among the most difficult to conceptualize and measure are the classifications within conservative theological orientations, e.g., fundamentalist, charismatic, and born again; see Wilcox (1996).

18 We employ the Tau b and Tau c measures of association for the bivariate relationships because the variables are measured ordinally: Tau b is used when the number of rows and columns are equal, Tau c when they are unequal; see SPSS (1999). However to control for the
effects of the other independent variables, we use Pearson Product Moment partials; we do this because Pearson partials produce a single number for each partial, whereas using Tau's to partial produces a partial within each category of the control variable thereby (in our data) producing at least four partials for each independent variable with each dependent variable. While Pearson Product Moment coefficients technically require interval level of measurement, they are routinely used with ordinally-measured variables such as ours because the results are very similar. To illustrate with our data, the Pearson zero-order coefficients are slightly higher than the Tau's; specifically for example, the Tau b between white female TCP's family income and white female TCP's interest in government and politics is 0.216, whereas the zero-order Pearson correlation is 0.256. To reiterate: to be as accurate and cautious as possible, we report the bivariate relationships in terms of Tau b's and Tau c's, and to be as parsimonious as possible, while still accurate, we report the partials in terms of Pearson Product Moment coefficients.